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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be
heard. In this case, plaintiff Dawn Hassell intentionally maneuvered to
deprive non-party Yelp of both. She gave Yelp no notice of her request for
an injunction against Yelp, preventing the company from responding to her
unfounded and unlawful requests. Incredibly, Hassell's tactics succeeded
and she secured a mandatory injunction directing Yelp to remove content
on its website before it had even been served or had any opportunity to
oppose the unconstitutional injunction she sought. A clearer violation of
due process rarely presents itself, and yet the trial court denied Yelp's
motion to vacate its order and judgment. This Court should reverse and
vacate the trial court's judgment.
Non-party Yelp allows members of the public to read and write
reviews - free of charge - about businesses, government agencies, and
other local entities, on its website, Yelp.com. Hassell and the law firm she
owns ("Hassell") sued her former client Ava Bird, alleging that Bird
authored and posted defamatory statements about Hassell on Yelp's
website. The lawsuit does not name Yelp as a defendant or seek any relief
against Yelp, and the only named defendant, Bird, defaulted. Hassell then,
without providing any notice to Yelp, sought an injunction against Bird and
Yelp. The court granted the injunction as requested (without separately
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analyzing whether or not such an injunction was proper as to Yelp) and
ordered Yelp to remove the statements from its website.
In the months that followed, after receiving notice of the judgment
and injunction, Yelp attempted to resolve the dispute with Hassell outside
of court, explaining that the injunction was void given the lack of due
process afforded to Yelp, and that Yelp itself was immune from such an
injunction under Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act
("Section 230" or "CD A''). When its attempts were unsuccessful, Yelp
moved the trial court to vacate the judgment. The trial court rejected
Yelp's due process arguments on the ground that Yelp was "acting in
concert" with Bird due to Yelp's attempts to overturn the injunction and its
continued publication of the content at issue. The trial court did not address
Yelp's Section 230 arguments in its decision.
This Court should reverse and vacate the trial court's judgment for
three reasons.
First, the court's issuance of an injunction without notice to Yelp
denied Yelp its due process rights. Hassell's intentional decision to not
provide Yelp with any notice of her application for an injunction deprived
Yelp of the ability to object and prevent entry of the injunction. No
evidence supports the trial court's primary reason for refusing to vacate the
injunction- that Yelp purportedly acted in concert with Bird in some way.
The trial court's conclusion to the contrary overlooks that as a matter of
2

law, simply continuing to display third-party authored content on its
website cannot transform Yelp into an aider or abetter. Yelp's decision not
to remove the reviews from its website reflects nothing more than Yelp's
legitimate objections to, and its refusal to comply with, an injunction that
ignored the federal immunity that Yelp enjoys under Section 230, and is
unconstitutional on its face. The legal arguments Yelp made in seeking
relief from the void injunction merely reflect Yelp's determination to assert
its statutory and constitutional rights. In addition, the injunction is void for
the independent reason that it violates the notice requirements of due
process protected by Code of Civil Procedure Section 580 which provides
that a default judgment cannot award relief greater than that sought in the
complaint. Here, having sought an injunction only against Bird in her
Complaint, Hassell cannot obtain an injunction against Yelp as part of a
default judgment. See infra at Argument I.

Second, federal law that was enacted with companies like Yelp in
mind-47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l)-prohibits courts from ordering website
providers like Yelp to remove content provided by third parties. Yelp did
not author the allegedly defamatory statements at issue. Hassell alleges that
Yelp was an "active participant" in publishing the information, but such
editorial conduct is precisely what Section 230 shields. Every entity
protected by Section 230 takes action to publish third-party content, and
there is no "operative distinction between 'active' and 'passive' Internet
3

use" for purposes of applying immunity under Section 230. Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 62 (2006). None of the practices that Hassell
identified below transfonn Yelp into the creator or developer of the
comments, and as such, Yelp is immune from an injunction. See infra at
Argument II.
Third, the injunction is overbroad, and thus constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint against speech. The injunction purports to
prevent two unnamed users from posting any future reviews on Yelp's
website, regardless of topic or content. The injunction here also applies to
two statements that were not properly before the trial court, as Hassell
failed to identify them with particularity as libelous statements in the
Complaint. Indeed, one of the two statements was not posted on Yelp until
months after Hassell filed and served her Complaint. As such, Hassell
cannot overcome the heavy presumption against this prior restraint's
constitutional validity. See infra at Argument III.
For all these reasons, the trial court's denial ofYelp's motion to
vacate should be reversed.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

A.

Yelp Learns that the Trial Court, without Notice, Has
Entered Judgment Against It in a Lawsuit to which It
Was Not a Party.

Yelp's website, Yelp.com, allows members of the public to read and
write reviews about local businesses, govermnent services, and other
4

entities. A00240,

~

2. Yelp is available to the public at no charge and

without any registration requirement. Id.

~

4. Those who register by

creating an account may write reviews about businesses and service
providers, and thus contribute to a growing body of publicly-available
consumer reviews. A00240, ~ 6. The reviews on Y elp.com are read by
tens of millions of other users when making a wide range of consumer and
other decisions. !d. The website provides both a search function and a
.social network to its users.

!d.,~

2.

On January 28, 2014, Yelp's registered agent for service of process
received notice of entry of judgment or order, together with a letter
threatening Yelp with contempt proceedings if it did not comply with the
order. A00537-547. Yelp had never been served or otherwise notified that
the plaintiff in the action, Dawn Hassell, had asked a trial court to enter a
mandatory injunction compelling Yelp to remove both existing and future
third-party content from its website. A00243, ~~ 3-5.
Yelp soon learned that Hassell is an attorney located in San
Francisco and owns The Hassell Law Group, P.C. A00006, ~~ 21, 22.
Hassell and her finn had sued Ava Bird, a resident of Berkeley, California.
A00002 ~ 1. According to Hassell's Complaint, Bird had suffered a
personal injury on June 16, 2012, and first met with The Hassell Law
Group on July 9, 2012, to discuss hiring Hassell to represent her in a
personal injury suit. A00003, ~ 5. On August 20, 2012, Bird returned a
5

signed copy of Hassell's attorney-client fee agreement and thus hired The
Hassell Law Group. A00003, ~ 7. Hassell claims that thereafter, her firm
contacted Bird's insurance company and communicated with Bird herself.
A00004, ~~ 9 and !0. On September 13, 2012, Hassell withdrew from legal
representation of Bird. A00003, ~ 8.
1.

Third-party users write negative reviews about
Hassell Law Group on Y elp.com.

On January 28, 2013, a user with the screen name "Birdzeye B.",
identified as located in Los Angeles, CA, posted a one-star review (out of a
possible five stars) of The Hassell Law Group on Yelp.com, complaining
that "dawn hassell made a bad situation much worse for me. she told me
she could help with my personal injury case ... then reneged on the case
because her mom had a broken leg, or something like that, and that the
insurance company was too much for her to handle." The review went on
to state, "the hassell law group didn't ever speak with the insurance
company either, neglecting their said responsibilities and not living up to
their own legal contract! nor did they bother to communicate with me, the
client or the insurance company AT ALL." AOOO 18.
Believing that "Birdzeye B." was Bird, Hassell sent Bird an email on
January 28, 2013, requesting she remove the "factual inaccuracies and
defamatory remarks" from Yelp.com. A00005, ~ 15. Bird sent a reply
email the next day, complaining about Hassell's representation, stating,
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"the few calls you did make to the insurance were feeble: once to say you
were handling the case, once you left a belated non-sense voicemail and
once you called them to withdraw from the case. [B]ut, at no time, DID
YOU ACTUALLY FOLLOW THROUGH ON ANYTHING
SUBSTANTIAL!" A00348. The email also indicated that Hassell's
landlord might write a review as well. A00350.
On February 6, 2013, a new one star review for The Hassell Law
Group appeared on Yelp from a different user account with the screen name
"J.D.," identified as being located in Alameda, California. The review
stated, "Did not like the fact that they charged me their client to make
COPIES, send out FAXES, POSTAGE, AND FOR MAKING PHONE
CALLS about my case!!! Isn't that your job. That's just ridiculous!!!
They [d]educted all those expenses out of my settlement." A00020. The
firm's apparently standard attorney-client fee agreement does provide that
costs, including making copies, faxing, postage, and phone calls, are
deducted from settlement amounts. See A0007l.
Hassell alleges that the firm "conducted a diligent and
comprehensive investigation to detennine if plaintiffs had ever represented
anyone with the initials 'J.D.' from Alameda and determined that plaintiffs
had not done so." A00005, ~ 18. Despite the fact that the author of the
review could plainly be using a pseudonym, that Bird's initials were also
not J.D., that Bird had not received any settlement amount, and that she had
7

not previously used capital letters at the beginning of her sentences, Hassell
assumed that the poster "J.D." was Bird, based solely on the use of
capitalization and the dates of the reviews. A00005, ~ 18.

2.

Hassell brings a defamation suit against Bird based
on the "Birdzeye B." Review.

On April I 0, 2014, both Dawn Hassell individually, and the Hassell
Law Group P.C., filed a complaint against Bird in San Francisco Superior
Court. See A00002. The suit included claims for libel, trade libel, invasion
of privacy- false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
sought both compensatory and punitive damages. It also sought injunctive
relief against Bird only. See A00013:6-13. While the Complaint
referenced the review by "J.D." dated February 6, 2013, and attached that
review as Exhibit C, it did not identify the statements with particularity as
defamatory statements, or explain what was allegedly libelous about them,
as it did with Birdzeye B.'s review. See A0006-8,

~ 26

(a)-(g), ~ 27 (a)-(g).

Hassell's process server began attempting personal service at what
he believed to be Bird's home in Oakland on Aprill3, 2013 (despite
Hassell's Complaint stating that Bird resided in Berkeley and that the Yelp
profile page for Birdzeye B. describes the user's location as Los Angeles).
See A00026. Four days later, on April 17 at 8:30a.m., Hassell relied on

substitute service. The neighbor with whom the process server left the
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documents said that "he owns [the] property and hasn't seen her [sic] in a
couple months." A00026.
On June 20,2013, Hassell sought an entry of default against Bird.
See A00022. The Court rejected the request as premature and incomplete.
!d.

On July 11, 2013, the court entered a default against Bird because
she failed to appear and contest the allegations of Hassell's Complaint.
A00023.

3.

The trial court awards an injunction, without
notice, against non-party Yelp, enjoining three
statements and all future speech of two user
accounts.

On November 1, 2013, Hassell filed a Summary of the Case in
Support of Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive Relief that differed
from the Complaint in a number of significant respects.
First, Hassell expanded her libel claim and sought relief based on
three reviews, when the Complaint had only identified statements with

particularity from one review. Compare A00033-36 with A00006-08. In
addition to BirdzEye B.'s January 28, 2013 review, which was the basis of
the libel claim in the Complaint (A000006-08), her Summary of the Case in
support of her Application for Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive
Relief also sought to enjoin the "J.D." review, which merely stated that the
poster "did not like" the firm's admitted policy of deducting from clients'
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settlements for costs of the firm making copies, sending faxes, using
postage and making phone calls, and then opined, "Isn't that your job.
That's just ridiculous!!" A00050-51. Hassell argued-for the first timethat this review was "accusing Plaintiff of a crime, either fraud or theft by
taking more money from the recovery than Plaintiff was allowed." A00035
at 6:20-23.
The Summary also sought relief for statements that were posted on
April29, 2013, after Hassell had filed the Complaint, which was never
amended. A00036, A00050-51. The comments, posted by "Birdzeye B."
were an update on the original review, and stated that Hassell:
"has filed a lawsuit against me over this review I
posted on yelp! she has tried to threaten, bully,
intimidate, harass me into removing the review! she
actually hired another bad attorney to fight this. lol!
well, looks like my original review has turned out to be
truer than ever. avoid this business like the plague
folks! and the staff at YELP has stepped up and is
defending my right to post a review. once again,
thanks YELP! And I have reported her actions to the
Better Business Bureau as well, so they have a record
of how she handles business. [A]nother good resource
is the BBB, by the way." 1
AOO I 02. Hassell explained in her Summary that the update "implies again
that Plaintiffs are unethical in their business practices." A00036 at 7:13.

1

In response to this posting, Dawn H. of The Hassell Law Group responded
on Yelp.com, writing a lengthy explanation of her view of the events,
including that "The statements in this review are simply not TRUE." See
A00244.
10

Second, Hassell significantly expanded the relief being sought. In
addition to seeking over a half million dollars in damages, Hassell for the
first time demanded that the "Court should also make an order compelling
Defendant and Yelp.com to remove the defamatory statements, including
all 3 entire posts, immediately. If for any reason Defendant does not
remove them all by the Court-ordered deadline (which is likely given
Defendant's refusal to answer the complaint), the Court should order
Yelp.com to remove all3 of them." A00051 at 22:2-6 (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiffs' Request for Judgment went even further. There, Hassell
sought "an Order ordering Yelp.com to remove the reviews and subsequent
comments of the reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the court's
Order." A00051 at 22:25-26 (emphasis added). Thus, based on speculation
that Bird posted as both Birdzeye B. and J.D., Hassell sought to enjoin any
future speech by these users, and Yelp's display of that speech, regardless
of whether any future comment might be true, or constitutionally protected
opinion, or on a different topic, or absolutely privileged.
Even though the speech at issue was on Yelp.com and she
specifically sought an order enjoining Yelp's publication of that speech,
Hassell did not serve her application for default judgment on Yelp. The
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court granted the requested injunction. See A00213 at 2:7-9. 2 The court
did not make any factual fmdings as to non-party Yelp.

B.

Yelp Moves the Trial Court to Vacate the Injunction of
Which It Had No Prior Notice.

On January 28, 2014, Hassell sent a letter attaching the Order to
Yelp's registered agent of process, with a Notice of Entry of Judgment or
Order. A00537-547. In the letter, Hassell threatened that "Yelp, Inc.'s
non-compliance with the court's order will become the subject of contempt
proceedings and a further lawsuit against Yelp if Yelp refuses to comply as
my business is being further damaged." A00537.
On February 3, 2014, Yelp's Senior Director of Litigation, Aaron
Schur, responded to Hassell by letter. He stated that as a non-party who did
not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard, Yelp was not bound by the
terms of the Judgment. A00548-550. He further explained that the
Communications Decency Act Section 230 precludes enforcement of the
injunction, or liability as to Yelp, given that Hassell's claim arose from
third-party content published on Yelp's website. A00549. Finally, Mr.
Schur stated that "your threats against Yelp are not well taken. If you
pursue an action against Yelp premised on its publication of these reviews,
Yelp will promptly seek dismissal of such action and its attorneys' fees

2

The court also accepted Hassell's representations about the damages she
suffered and ordered that Bird pay Hassell over half a million dollars in
monetary damages. See A00212.
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under California's anti-SLAPP law, as it has in the past in similar cases."
A00550.
Hassell did not respond until April 30, 2014, nearly three months
later. In a letter bearing that date, she claimed that her office was
"currently setting a motion to enforce the court's order against Yelp."
A0055l. She did not respond or acknowledge Yelp's arguments that the
injunction was procedurally and substantively improper.
On May 23, 2014, Yelp moved the court to vacate the Judgment.
A00225-226. Yelp argued that the Judgment was void because it (a) was
issued without notice or an opportunity for Yelp to be heard, and thus
violated Yelp's due process rights; (b) exceeded the scope of relief
requested in the Complaint, and was therefore barred by Code Civ. Proc. §
580; (c) was prohibited under Section 230 of the Federal Communications
Decency Act; and (d) was issued in violation of the First Amendment.
A00231-36.

C.

Hassell Opposes the Motion to Vacate, Claiming that Yelp
is "Aiding and Abetting" Defendant Bird by Challenging
the Injunction.

Hassell opposed Yelp's motion to vacate. She argued that Yelp's
motion to vacate was untimely, and that the court's authority to rule on the
motion to set aside and vacate the judgment had expired. A00480: 1A00481: 19. She also argued, for the first time in the litigation, that the lack
of notice and due process afforded to Yelp was permissible because (I) it
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"was the only meaningful remedy available to Plaintiff' and (2) Yelp was
allegedly "acting in concert with Defendant Bird." A00481 :20-21.
Similarly, Hassell argued that Section 230 did not bar injunctive relief
against Yelp because Yelp was "actively participating in promoting the
defamation of Plaintiffs." A00486: 19-20.
Hassell primarily based her argument that Yelp was "acting in
concert" with Bird on Yelp's refusal to comply with an injunction that Yelp
had received no prior notice of or an opportunity to contest before it was
entered. A00482:27-A00483:3. Hassell argued that "Yelp's continued
persistence refusing to take down Bird's review has caused and continues
to cause i~ury to Plaintiffs, but Yelp has done nothing and here defends
itself and Ava Bird arguing that the findings against Bird are even invalid!"

A00483: 18-21 (emphasis in original). Thus, according to Hassell, Yelp's
act of merely challenging the validity of the injunction against Yelp,
pointing out that it was entered without prior notice to Yelp, was itself

sufficient evidence of Yelp "aiding and abetting" Bird.
In addition, Hassell argued that "Yelp has maintained and classified
the 'Birdzeye' review as a 'Recommended Review' constituting action by
Yelp of representing the review as truthful." A00483:4-5. In support of
this argument, Hassell submitted a print-out from Yelp's website for The
Hassell Law Group. A00518. It showed that The Hassell Law Group had
an average ranking of four and a half stars -half a star short of the highest
14

possible ranking- based on 12 reviews. The 12 reviews were listed under
the small heading, "Recommended Reviews for The Hassell Law Group"the same heading format used for all reviewed businesses listed on Yelp's
website. Birdzeye B's review, with Dawn H's comment in response below
it, were listed among the 12. On a separate web-page, Yelp displayed a

number of reviews for The Hassell Law Group that are currently not
recommended. A00519. This included the J.D. review, about which
Hassell also complains, as well as nine other reviews that Hassell claimed
were positive. The page also included the following explanation from
Yelp:
What Are Recommended Reviews?

We get millions of reviews from our users, so we use
automated software to recommend the ones that are
most helpful for the Yelp community. The software
looks at dozens of different signals, including various
measures of quality, reliability, and activity on Yelp.
The process has nothing to do with whether a business
advertises on Yelp or not. The reviews that currently
don't make the cut are listed below and are not
factored into this business's overall star rating. Learn
more here.
A00519.
Hassell also argued that Yelp was "acting in concert with Bird"
because "Yelp's Terms of Services expressly state that a Yelp user agrees
to not post defamatory reviews," and Yelp "chose not to enforce its own
rules prohibiting defamatory reviews." A00483:5-6, 14-15.
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Finally, Hassell argued that Yelp's Terms of Service created an
agent-principal relationship with Bird through licensing provisions.
A00484:11-16.
In its reply brief and at oral argument, Yelp contested each of these
arguments and repeatedly represented that it was not acting on behalf of
Bird.

D.

The Trial Court Denies the Motion to Vacate and this
Appeal Follows.

On September 29, 2014, the trial court denied Yelp's motion to set
aside and vacate the judgment. A00808. It quoted from Ross v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 899, 906 (1977), and Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.
719, 721 ( 1917), for the proposition that injunctions may run to non-parties
who are aiding and abetting an enjoined person to violate an injunction. It
found "a factual basis to support Hassell's contention that Yelp is aiding
and abetting Bird's violation of the injunction." A00809.
First, it described Yelp's automated software that distinguished
between "recommended" and "not recommended" reviews as evidence
"that Yelp highlighted at least one ofBird's defamatory reviews about the
Hassell Law Firm on its website by featuring it as a 'Recommended
Review."' A00809. The court also noted that "Yelp's website also
indicates that a litany of favorable reviews are not factored into the Hassell
Law Firm's star rating, appearing to give emphasis to Bird's defamatory

16

review." Id. The court failed to acknowledge that the Birdzeye B. review
was displayed as "recommended" prior to the entry of the injunction, that
Yelp's system of categorizing reviews as "recommended" or "not
recommended" undisputedly occurs through automated software, or that
Yelp's recommendation software system was also in operation before the
entry of the injunction. A00519 .3 Thus, no facts demonstrated that Yelp
took any intentional act to conspire with Bird to thwart the injunction.

Second, the court believed that Yelp was "acting on behalf of Bird"
by moving to set aside the judgment in its entirety, even though Yelp had
alternatively asked for the judgment to be partially vacated to eliminate all
provisions pertaining to Yelp. The court stated that it concluded that Yelp
was "acting on behalf of Bird" because Yelp argued that Hassell had failed
to establish that Bird actually posted the Yelp reviews, and that Hassell had
not properly effectuated substitute service on Bird. A00809. The court
described these arguments as having been made "on behalf of Bird,"
despite acknowledging Yelp's contention that "it is an uninterested third
party." The court stated that there was "a unity of interest between Bird
and Yelp." A00810.
Third, the court believed that Yelp was aiding and abetting the
alleged ongoing violation ofthe injunction because "Yelp refuses to delete"

3

See also http://officialblog.yelp.com/2013/lllyelp-recommendedreviews.html
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the reviews, and claimed that Yelp's refusal is inconsistent with its Terms
of Service, which requires its users not to write defamatory reviews (but
does not represent that Yelp will remove all allegedly defamatory reviews).
A00810.
The court did not address Yelp's argument that the initial grant of
the injunction against Yelp- which occurred before Yelp had notice or an
opportunity to argue on its behalf, and before Hassell had provided any
evidence or argument regarding "recommended reviews"- was void. Nor
did the court make any reference to or discuss the immunity provided by
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court should conduct an independent, de novo review of the
trial court's denial of Yelp's Motion to Vacate. Both the United States and
California Supreme Courts have held that appellate courts, when reviewing
appeals raising fundamental issues of free speech such as Yelp has raised
here, should exercise independent appellate review. In Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 5!0-11 (!984) the United

States Supreme Court made clear that "[t]he requirement of independent
appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of
federal constitutional law .... It reflects a deeply held conviction that
judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such
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review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained
by the Constitution."
The California Supreme Court echoed those sentiments in In re

George T., 33 Cal. 4th 620, 632 (2004): "What is evident is that the high
court has employed the independent review standard in varied First
Amendment contexts as an added safeguard against infringement of First
Amendment rights." The Supreme Court further instructed that a reviewing
court must "make an independent examination of the whole record,
including a review of the constitutionally relevant facts de novo,
independently of any previous determinations by [the lower court]." Id. at
634 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because application
of Section 230 raises First Amendment issues as well (see Argument II,
below), independent review is also appropriate. And, of course, when
deciding "the proper interpretation and application of a statute or
constitutional provision, our review is de novo." In re Lugo, 164 Cal. App.
4th 1522, 1535 (2008).
Similarly, the law is clear that questions regarding an appellant's due
process rights are matters of law subject to independent review. See
Mohilefv. Janovici, 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 285 (1996) ("Because the

[appellants'] contention regarding procedural matters presents a pure
question of law involving the application of the due process clause, we
review the trial court's decision de novo"); In re A.B., 230 Cal. App. 4th
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1420, 1434 (2014) ("Mother's due process contentions present an issue of
law which we review de novo"); Menge v. Reed, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1134,
1139 (2000) ("Whether the DMV's administrative procedures comply with
due process is a question oflaw, and we review the trial court's
determination of that question de novo").
De novo review by this Court is also required under Code of Civil
Procedure section 663. Appellate review of a denial of a motion
under section 663 is ordinarily limited "to a determination of whether the
conclusions of law and judgment are consistent with and supported by the
findings of fact." Newbury v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n of City ofLos Angeles,
42 Cal. App. 2d 258, 259 (1940). Whether the trial court has drawn an
incorrect legal conclusion from the facts found is a question of law to
which the Court applies de novo review. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep 't of
Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1144
( 1999). Likewise, "[ c]onstruction and application of a statute involve
questions of law, which require independent review." Delfino v. Agilent
Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790 (2006) (citations omitted); see also
Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 71 Cal. App.
4th 38, 49 (1998).

20

ARGUMENT
I.

DUE PROCESS BARS THE INJUNCTION AGAINST
YELP
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Yelp's Motion to
Vacate the Injunction, Which Violates Yelp's Due Process
Rights.

The trial court's order denying Yelp's motion to vacate should be
overturned because the injunction violates Yelp's due process rights under
both the United States and California Constitutions. The requirement of
notice and hearing is firmly rooted in principles of justice, and indeed, the
United States and California Constitutions. 4 As the court made clear in

Estate ofBuchman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 559 (1954), "The fundamental
conception of a court of justice is condenmation only after notice and
hearing." The court further noted that "[t]he power vested in a judge is to
hear and determine, not to determine without hearing," and that the
Constitution requires a fair hearing. !d. at 560. See also People v.

Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260,263-64 (1979) (holding that application of the due
process clauses of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I,§ 7 subd.
(a); id., § 15.), "must be determined in the context of the individual's due
process liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures");

Kash Enters., Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 308 (1977) ("the
4

Although interpretations of the scope of the Due Process clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not binding on interpretations of the
Due Process clauses of the California Constitution, Courts generally apply
such holdings unless given a reason not to do so. See, e.g., Garfinkle v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268,282 (1978).
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Constitution generally requires that an individual be accorded notice and
some fonn of hearing before he is deprived of a protected property or
liberty interest"); Today 's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Office of
Educ., 57 Cal. 4th 197,212 (2013) ("The essence of due process is the
requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the
case against him and opportunity to meet it.") (internal marks and citations
omitted); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547 (1971)
(recognizing "the long-standing procedural due process principle which
dictates that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual may not
be deprived of his life, liberty or property without notice and hearing").
Consequently, as the United States Supreme Court has held, courts
"may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make
punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights
have not been adjudged according to law." Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945). And the Supreme Court of California long ago
reaffirmed as a "seemingly self-evident proposition that a judgment in
personam may not be entered against one not a party to the action." Fazzi
v. Peters, 68 Cal. 2d 590, 591 (1968). As one court later observed,
"[r]endering a judgment for or against a nonparty to a lawsuit may
constitute denial of due process under the United States and California
Constitutions" because the "nonjoined party has not been given notice of
the proceedings or an opportunity to be heard." Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank
22

A. Logoluso Farms, 214 Cal. App. 3d 699, 717-18 (1989) (citations

omitted).
Yet despite this settled constitutional principle, and without Yelp
having any notice or an opportunity to object to the injunction before it was
entered, the trial court granted Hassell's request for entry of an injunction
to enjoin speech hosted by Yelp, violating Yelp's constitutional rights. The
First Amendment protects Yelp's right to distribute the speech of others
without an injunction, regardless of the fact that the speech was created and
developed by others. Yelp simply cannot be denied those rights without
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Marcus
v. Search Warrants ofProperty, 367 U.S. 717,736-37 (1961) (distributors

suffered unconstitutional denial of due process where state seized allegedly
obscene publications without notice or a hearing prior to seizure, impairing
distributors' freedom of speech).
Hassell was well aware that Yelp's rights would be implicated when
she moved for a default judgment; as she put it, she "anticipated that
Defendant Bird would refuse to remove the Yelp review" and therefore
"asked the court to also order Yelp to take the review down." A00482 at
6:14-17. Nevertheless, rather than pursue contempt proceedings against
Bird, or add Yelp as a defendant to her initial suit and provide notice of this
action, she instead sought to enjoin Yelp directly knowing that Yelp had
not been named as a defendant, or served with any summons, pleadings,
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discovery, subpoenas, or motions, in the Action prior to the Judgment.
A00243, ~~ 3-5. In fact, at the hearing on the motion to vacate, Hassell
made the remarkable admission that she did not name Yelp in her
Complaint because Yelp informed her that it was irmnune from suit under
Section 230. A00837: 13-15 ("They also told my lawyer that they are
immune from suit under 230 ... so they were not sued."). 5 In other words,
because she was convinced of Yelp's Section 230 immunity, she decided to
wait until she had a default judgment against Bird, then sought to add Yelp
to the resulting injunction rather than give Yelp an opportunity in court to
argue its immunity from suit and injunction under Section 230. That is the

essence of a due process violation. Instead of recognizing this clear
violation of Yelp's due process rights, however, the trial court granted the
relief Hassell requested. 6

5

Yelp's immunity from suit and injunction under Section 230 is discussed
infra, Argument II.

6

In a Supplemental Opposition to Nonparty Yelp Inc.'s Reply
Memorandmn of Points and Authorities, Hassell asserted that Yelp did
have notice, because Hassell's former counsel had sent Yelp's general
counsel, not Yelp's registered agent for service of process, a letter in May
2013, attaching the Complaint - which did not name Yelp as a party - and
included the boiler plate language in its Prayer for Relief that it sought
"such other and further relief as the court may deem proper." A00586:324. Of course, if such conduct constituted sufficient notice, California's
rules regarding service of process would be superfluous and the concept of
due process would lose all meaning. There is no dispute that Hassell failed
to serve Yelp with any notice that she was seeking an injunction against
Yelp before the injunction was issued.
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Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp., 75 Cal.

App. 4th 110, 120-21 (1999) is instructive. In that case, insurance
underwriters ("Underwriters") entered into an agreement to reimburse a
roofing contractor in its litigation against a general contractor. After the
roofing contractor obtained a judgment against the general contractor (but
not the Underwriters), the roofing contractor moved for the Underwriters to
be added as judgment debtors. The trial court granted the contractor's
motion. Tokio Marine, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 113-15.
The Court of Appeal reversed, noting that the "Underwriters
themselves did not assert any claim in this action, and no litigant sued the
Underwriters in this litigation to determine any issue whatsoever." Tokio
Marine, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 119. Accordingly, when the trial court granted

the roofing contractor's motion, the Underwriters were deprived of a
"summons or complaint setting forth the issues to be joined," "discovery,"
"setting of a trial date," the "opportunity to assemble evidence or witnesses
on the merits or to prepare for a trial," the "opportunity to brief and be
heard on the legal issues raised," the "opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses," and a "trial (either jury or non-jury)." !d. at 120-21. In all, the
court concluded that the trial court's order "was a rather straightforward
denial ofdue process." !d. at 121 (emphasis added). If due process

requires that insurance underwriters, having entered into a contract
concerning litigation, be given notice and a hearing before they are bound

25

by any judgment arising from that litigation, then it necessarily requires that
Yelp also have been given a notice and hearing before being enjoined for
hosting third-party speech. The conclusion that the Judgment should have
been vacated on due process grounds alone is inescapable.

B.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding the Lack of Notice Was
Justified.

The trial court erred in determining that Yelp could be bound by the
injunction despite having received no prior notice of it or any opportunity
to object. It relied on Ross v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 899, 906 (1977)
and Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 721 (1917), which both state,
"In matters of injunction ... it has been a common practice to make the
injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the enjoined person
may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abetters, etc., though
not parties to the action." Ross, 10 Cal. 3d at 906, citing Berger, 175 Cal.
at 721. The trial court believed that there was "a factual basis to support
Hassell's contention that Yelp is aiding and abetting Bird' s violation of the
injunction," and on that basis, concluded that the injunction could run to
non-party Yelp despite the lack of notice. A00809.
The rule articulated in Ross and Berger however, applies where a
group or organization has been enjoined, so as to prevent the group's
individual members who are not named in the injunction from acting on
behalf of that group. It is, in essence, an administrative solution to secure a
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group's compliance with an injunction by applying the injunction to its
individual members. As the Supreme Court clarified in People ex rd

Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th I 090, 1124 (1997), application of injunctive
relief to non-parties permitted in Ross and Berger applies "to labor unions,
abortion protesters or other identifiable groups" because "such groups can
act only through the medium oftheir membership" (emphasis added).
Thus, in Ross, the Supreme Court held that the boards of supervisors were
bound by an injunction against the state welfare agency because
"[i]nasmuch as county boards of supervisors bear an on-going statutory
responsibility for the local administration of welfare benefits, such boards
of supervisors are clearly general agents of the state welfare agency with
respect to such administrative duties." 19 Cal. 3d at 908.
In this case, indisputably however, Bird is not a "group" and Yelp is
not a member. None of the practical considerations about enjoining
members of a group that existed in Ross and Berger exist here because
naming Yelp in the initial complaint and giving Yelp notice and
opportunity to be heard to object to the injunction would have imposed no
additional burden on Hassell - other than forcing her to establish her right
to relief, if any, against Yelp.
Moreover, even if Ross and Berger were applicable, the facts do not
support the theory that Yelp was somehow "aiding and abetting" Bird' s
violation of the injunction. The trial court cited its belief that Yelp
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"highlighted at least one ofBird's defamatory reviews about the Hassell
Law Firm on its website by featuring it as a 'Recommended Review"' and
that Yelp's website failed to factor into Hassell's review "a litany of
favorable reviews ... appearing to give emphasis to Bird's defamatory
review." A00809. A closer examination of the Yelp website, however,
belies the trial court's conclusions. Yelp uses automated software--in
place for years before the injunction issued- to determine whether a
review is categorized as "recommended" or "not recommended"; therefore,
Yelp did not choose to "highlight" any particular review after the injunction
was issued. See A00519; see also
http://officialblog. yelp.com/20 13/ ll/yelp-recommended-reviews.html. In
fact, the review at issue was "recommended" before the injunction existed.
Merely continuing to host third-party content, and continuing to apply to it
the same software that is applied to all third-party content, cannot constitute
aiding and abetting. Yelp did not take any affirmative action at all in
response to the injunction and instead, as Hassell herself wrote, "has done
nothing." A00483: 18-2!.
Further, the trial court found that "Yelp is acting on behalf of Bird"
by making legal arguments as to the validity of the judgment. A00809.
But the trial court itself acknowledged that the rule articulated in Ross and
Berger requires that Yelp be "aiding and abetting Bird's violation ofthe
injunction." !d. (emphasis added). Simply asserting legal arguments in
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court about the validity of the injunction cannot constitute aiding and
abetting a violation of the injunction. Yelp did nothing more than
appropriately assert its objections to the constitutionality of the injunction,
even if some of those arguments would be equally available to Bird.
Pursuing such defenses in court can hardly be said to be "acting in concert"
with Bird, or all co-defendants that happen to make arguments that benefit
the other would be said to be "acting in concert" with each other. Indeed,
California law provides not only that an Internet service provider protected
under Section 230 may move to quash a subpoena for personally
identifying infonnation, where the action is pending in another state; it also
provides that if the underlying action arises from the service provider's
exercise of free speech, and if the respondent has failed to make a prima
facie showing of a cause of action, the successful service provider may be
awarded attorney's fees for so challenging. See Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1987.2(c) (providing process for quashing subpoena seeking identity of
users where issuing party fails to make a prima facie showing of a cause of
action). Given California's embrace oflnternet service providers
challenging actions that seek users' personal information, it cannot be the
law that Yelp's legal arguments as to the validity of the default judgment
constitute aiding and abetting.
Finally, the trial court found that Yelp was aiding and abetting Bird
because its refusal to delete Bird's allegedly defamatory reviews was
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"inconsistent with its own terms of service." A00810. Yelp's Terms of
Service, however, require its users not to write defamatory reviews, but
does not represent that Yelp itself will remove all allegedly defamatory
reviews. A00561-564. Indeed, in those same Terms of Service, Yelp
states, "We are under no obligation to enforce the Terms on your behalf
against another user. While we encourage you to let us know if you believe
another user has violated the Terms, we reserve the right to investigate and
take appropriate action at our sole discretion." A00562.
Nor does Yelp's refusal to remove the reviews pending appeal of the
injunction constitute aiding and abetting Bird. In Blockowicz v. Williams,
630 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2010), the court rejected the exact arguments that
Hassell makes here. It held that a website host was not aiding and abetting
defendants and could not be compelled to remove defamatory material from
their website pursuant to a pennanent injunction issued in an action to
which it was not a party. The court disregarded arguments that- like here
-the website host's terms of service did not allow users to post defamatory
content. The court noted that the website host did nothing after receiving
notice of the injunction, and found that "mere inactivity is simply
inadequate to render them aiders and abettors in violating the injunction."
!d. at 568. Similarly here, Yelp's refusal to remove the posts prior to the

resolution of this appeal cannot render Yelp into an aider or abettor. The
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grant of injunction against Yelp, a non-party to the underlying action, was
thus a clear violation of Yelp's due process rights.

C.

The Injunction Also Violates the Guarantee of
Fundamental Fairness Contained in Code of Civil
Procedure Section 580.

The entire Judgment, including the injunction against Yelp, is void
for another reason: it violates the "notice requirements of due process" that
"lie at the core of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 580." Finney v.
Gomez, Ill Cal. App. 4th 527, 535 (2003). Section 580 requires that "[t]he

relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that
demanded in the complaint." As a result, a "default judgment awarding
damages in excess of the amount allowed under Section 580 is beyond the
court's jurisdiction and therefore is void." Matera v. McLeod, 145 Cal.
App. 4th 44, 59 (2006). The rule applies equally to injunctions. Becker v.
S.P. V. Constr. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 489, 493-94 (1980).

California's Supreme Court has affirmed that Section 580 must be
strictly construed. See Greenup v. Rodman, 42 Cal. 3d 822, 826 (1986).
That is because Section 580 functions as "a guarantee of fundamental
fairness." Finney, 111 Cal. App. 4th at 534. "The 'primary purpose of the
section is to guarantee defaulting parties adequate notice of the maximum
judgment that may be assessed against them."' In reMarriage ofLippe!,
51 Cal. 3d 1160, (1990), citing Greenup, 42 Cal. 3d at 826. As the
California Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated, [Section 580] means what
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it says and says what it means: that a plaintiff cannot be granted more
relief than is asked for in the complaint." In reMarriage ofLippe!, 51 Cal.
3d at 1166.
Here, the Complaint only requested injunctive relief as to Bird, but
the Judgment ordered mandatory injunctive relief against Yelp. And while
the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint was limited to removal of
comments already posted on the Internet "about plaintiffs," (A000!3:24),
the Judgment provided much broader relief, extending the injunction to

future comments on any topic. A00212-213. In addition, the Complaint
identified with particularity only statements from one review, the first
review from Birdzeye B. A00006:22-A00008:7. The Judgment, however,
was based on three statements, one of which had not yet been posted at the
time the Complaint was filed. A00050-51 ("The Court should also make an
order compelling Defendant and Y elp.com to remove the defamatory
statements, including all 3 entire posts, immediately"). These violations of
Section 580 require reversal of the trial court's ruling.

II.

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT BARS THE
INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP
The Internet has effected one of the greatest expansions of free

speech and communications in history. It is "a tool for bringing together
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the small contributions of millions of people and making them matter." 7
Today, more than 2. 7 billion people use the Internet, submitting and
viewing hundreds of millions of posts, comments, photos, videos and other
content every day. 8 As the Supreme Court put it, "the content on the
Internet is as diverse as human thought." Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties

Union, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997) (citation omitted).
This is no accident. In 1996, to promote the free flow of information
on the Internet, Congress resolved to protect websites and other online
providers from state-law liability for their users' content. Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act embodies that command, prohibiting
courts from treating such a provider as the "publisher or speaker" of thirdparty content or holding it liable for taking steps to screen such material.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). Grounded in core First Amendment principles,
Section 230 offers strong protection for innovation and expansion of free
speech on the Internet. Since its enactment, federal and state courts have
consistently interpreted it to provide a "robust" immunity to companies that
7

Lev Grossman, You- Yes, You -Are TIME's Person of the Year, TIME
MAGAZINE (Dec. 25, 2006).
8
International Telecommunications Union, 2013 ICT Facts & Figures,
http://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures20 !3.pdf; Mary Madden and
Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of online adults use social networking sites (Aug.
26, 20 II), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/20 11/SocialNetworking-Sites.aspx (as of 20 II, 65% of online adults used social
networking sites); Josh James, How Much Data Is Created Every Minute?
(June 8, 2012), available at http://www.domo.com/blog/2012/06/howmuch-data-is-created-every-minute/? dkw=socf3.
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operate websites, such as Yelp, "from liability for publishing false or
defamatory material so long as the information was provided by another
party." Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (9th
Cir. 2003). In the words of California's Supreme Court, the statute is so
broad as to provide "blanket immunity for those who intentionally
redistribute defamatory statements on the internet." Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at
62-63. 9 It does so "to protect online freedom of expression and to
encourage self-regulation, as Congress intended." Id. at 63.

9

During oral argument on Yelp's motion, the trial court expressed disbelief
that the statute could mean what the California Supreme Court, and uniform
federal courts nationwide, have said it means. In first turning to Yelp's
counsel during the argument, the trial court said, "What you're saying is
you can post any kind of defamatory information for the world to see, and
you can say, we don't have anything to do with it. We don't care if they
say Ms. Hassell shot her mother, or something like that. It doesn't make
any difference. I think your position is a very hard one to swallow."
A00834:6-ll. While the Supreme Court expressed similar reservations
about the statute, it followed Congress' directive and held that as a matter
oflaw, websites like Yelp cannot be held liable for content posted by thirdparties, regardless of what that content contains. Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 6263. See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-30 (9th Cir. 2003);
Almeida v. Amazon. com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (lith Cir. 2006) ("The
majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad
federal innnunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.")
(internal citations and quotations omitted); Jones v. Dirty World Entm 't
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding TheDirty.com
is not an "information content provider" with respect to information it
publishes such that Section 230(c)(l) bars state-law tort claims predicated
on that infonnation); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010);
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,418 (5th Cir. 2008); Chicago Lawyers'
Comm.for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
671 (7th Cir. 2008); Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d
413, 418-19 (1st Cir. 2007); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471
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Specifically, the Act provides: "No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider," and it
preempts any state law, including imposition of tort liability, that is
inconsistent with its protections. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l) & (e)(3). Thus,
while a plaintiff may still pursue remedies against the actual creator of
allegedly unlawful online content, that plaintiff may not pursue common
law tort claims against a party so long as that party (I) is a "provider or user
of an interactive computer service"; (2) the complaint seeks to hold the
defendant liable as a "publisher or speaker"; and (3) the action is based on
"information provided by another information content provider." /d.; see

Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 828-29 (2002).
Section 230 bars the injunction against Yelp, as well as any liability
for failing to comply with the injunction. First, Yelp qualifies as a provider
of "an interactive computer service" because it operates a website.

Universal Commc 'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (lst Cir.
2007) ("web site operators ... are providers of interactive computer services
within the meaning of Section 230"); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030 n.l6.

Second, the injunction against Yelp treats it as a publisher or speaker. See
Kathleen R. v. City ofLivermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684, 698 (200 I);
(3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d
980,984-85 (lOth Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328
(4th Cir. 1997).
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Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., No. 4Dl3-3469, 2014
WL 6775236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2014). In Kathleen R., this Court
specifically found that Section 230, by its terms, precludes injunctive relief,
noting that "claims for ... injunctive relief are no less causes of action than
tort claims for damages, and thus fall squarely within the section 230( e)(3)
prohibition." See Kathryn R., 87 Cal. App. 4th at 698. Third, "Birdzeye
B." and "J.D.," the two users who posted comments on Yelp, are
"information content providers" because they are wholly responsible for the
creation of the content of the comments. See 47 U.S. C.§ 230(f)(3).
Hassell has never alleged, and cannot, that Yelp played any role in the
authorship ofBirdzeye B. or J.D.'s comments. Consequently, Yelp enjoys
the immunity of Section 230.
In the briefing below, Hassell conceded that Yelp is a provider of
interactive computer services, and that she is seeking to treat them as
publishers or speakers of information provided by readers. (A00486:27A00488:13.) Hassell argued, however, that Yelp should not be immune
because it "is actively participating in promoting the defamation of
Plaintiffs." A00486: 19-20. While Hassell did not analyze the provisions of
Section 230 or rely on any case law, she seemed to be articulating an
argument that Yelp was an "information content provider," and was
therefore not shielded from liability. The statute defines an information
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content provider as any party "responsible ... in part" for the "creation or
development of information." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
Hassell claimed that Yelp's alleged active participation took two
forms. First, she claimed that by applying its automated software to
distinguish between "non-recommended reviews" and "recommended
reviews," Yelp is an "active participant here, publishing information itself
recommending some reviews, over other reviews." A00487:21-22. She
claimed that "Yelp is expressing an opinion and affecting the opinion of
others by its act of recommending this review and deciding which reviews
will affect a 'Yelp rating' and which will not." A00487:25-27. Second, she
claimed that Yelp's Terms of Service grant Yelp such an "extraordinary"
license to the rights in reviews that Yelp "effectively claims ownership of
the user's reviews to do as it wishes with them." A00487: 1-5. She
concluded that this somehow results in Yelp "adopt[ing] Ms. Bird's legally
declared defamatory statement in full, despite having the ability to remove
or alter the review ... " A00487:7-9. Hassell's arguments fail because
neither Yelp's automated software, nor the scope of its license, is sufficient
to tum Yelp into an "information content provider," as required to defeat
immunity.
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A.

Yelp's Practice of"Recommending" Reviews Is a
Traditional Editorial Function Immunized by Section 230.

California courts, like those throughout the country, have squarely
rejected the same over-reaching theory of liability on which Hassell relies,
and instead adopted a "restrictive definition" of an "information content
provider" to narrow the kind of conduct a defendant must engage in before
losing its immunity under Section 230. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123.
For example, in Carafano, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant
did not facilitate the development of offending content where it provided
users with a "detailed questionnaire" that included multiple-choice
questions wherein members selected answers from menus providing
between four and nineteen options that were capable of resulting in libelous
profiles. !d. at 1121. In Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561,
572-73 (2009) the Court found a web site, as a publisher of third-party
content, had immunity, and that the decision "to restrict or make available
certain material - is expressly covered by section 230." In Goddard v.
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (N.D. Cal. 2009), the court
held that "a website operator does not become liable as an 'information
content provider' merely by 'augmenting the content [of online material]
generally."' (citation omitted). In Hupp v. Freedom Commc'ns, Inc., 221
Cal. App. 4th 398, 400, 405 (2013), the Court held that Section 230 barred
a lawsuit where the plaintiff alleged a newspaper "breached its user
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agreement with [plaintiff] by failing to remove comments made on their
website concerning" him where the comments were written and posted by
third parties. In Delfino v. Agilent Techs .• Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 80708 (2006), the Court held that Section 230 iimnunity applied to claims
brought by recipients of Internet threats against the transmitter of threats
and his employer, whose computer system he used. In Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit found Yahoo

immune where it failed to remove from its website material that was
harmful to plaintiff and "a dangerous, cruel, and highly indecent use of the
internet."

10

These decisions are part of a national consensus that Section 230
provides immunity even where a website "has an active, even aggressive
role in making available content prepared by others." Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). See also M.A. v. Village Voice
10

Similarly, in Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475,499 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005), New Jersey's highest court held that a website
operator was not an "information content provider" where it selectively
deleted reader posts while allowing others to remain. In Shiamili v. Real
Estate Group ~fN Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 285 (Ct. App. 2011), New
York's highest court held that a website that "promoted" a user's allegedly
defamatory comment to a stand-alone post, and accompanied the post with
an insulting illustration, remained immune from suit under Section 230.
While the website did provide some content, the Court held that the "added
headings and illustration do not materially contribute to the defamatory
nature of the third-party statements." !d. at 293. In Doe v. Am. Online,
Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (2001), the Florida Supreme Court found an Internet
service provider immune from claims of negligence by a mother who
alleged that a user had marketed obscene photographs and videotapes of
mother's minor son on the service provider's chat rooms.
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Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2011)
(finding Backpage immune under Section 230, rejecting plaintiffs
arguments that search functions and ad revenue optimization methods
transformed it into a content provider); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 966 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (similar holding). In keeping with this
consensus, the California Supreme Court specifically held that there is no
"operative distinction between 'active' and 'passive' Internet use" for
purposes of applying immunity under Section 230. Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at
62. It reasoned that a "user who actively selects and posts material based
on its content fits well within the traditional role of 'publisher.' Congress
has exempted that role from liability." !d. at 62. It further noted that were
it to depart from the national consensus that active service providers are
immune, it would be encouraging forum shopping. !d. at 58.
Courts have repeatedly and consistently found that the exact conduct
Hassell identifies here- Yelp's practice of separating out nonrecommended reviews - is merely a traditional editorial function, and does
not serve to defeat Yelp's immunity under Section 230. For example, in

Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. C-10-1321 EMC, 2011 WL 5079526 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 2011), affirmed on other grounds, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014),
the court found that "Yelp's alleged manipulation of [Plaintiffs'] review
pages - by removing certain reviews and publishing others or changing
their order of appearance - falls within the conduct immunized by §
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230( c)( I)." !d. at *6. That is because lawsuits "seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions
-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter contentare barred." !d., citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th
Cir. 1997).
Similarly, in Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., No. 155629112,2013 WL
3335071 (NY. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013), the court found that "Yelp's alleged
act of filtering out positive reviews does not make Yelp the creator or
developer of the alleged defamatory reviews. Yelp's choice to publish
certain reviews- whether positive or negative- is an exercise of a
publisher's traditional editorial function protected by the CDA."

Braverman, 2011 WL 3335071 at *3, citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d at
1030 and Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
In Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 29 Misc. 3d 713, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), a
New York court found that allegations that Yelp's business plan included
removing positive reviews of businesses who refused to advertise, even if
true (which Yelp denied), could not negate the immunity provided by
Section 230. The court specifically held that the act of selecting which
material to publish is the publisher's quintessential role and a website will
not lose its immunity for acting as a publisher. See 29 Misc.3d at 717, 907
N.Y.S.2d at 414 (citing Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465,471 (3d
Cir. 2003)).
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And in Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., No. C13-1734 RAJ, 2014 WL 1805551
(W.D. Wash. May 7, 20 14), a plaintiff sued Yelp for libel based on the
display of a review strikingly similar to Birdzeye B's, capitals and all. The
court found that Section 230 applied to bar the defamation claims, and that
because the user "Sarah K." posted the review, Yelp could not quality as
the information content provider of the reviews, regardless of its provision
of a star rating system.
Here, Hassell's claims are no different than those that came before it.
She alleges that "Yelp's actions of specifically categorizing reviews,
recommending and making Ms. Bird's review more visible than others
precludes Yelp in this case from 47 USC 230 §(c)(!) protection."
A00487:27-28. Thus, Hassell identifies the same editorial conduct that no
less than four courts have each specifically found to be immunized, and that
the California Supreme Court generally found exempted from liability, i.e.,
actively selecting and posting material based on its content. Barrett, 40
Cal. 4th at 62. Moreover, conduct far more aggressive and active than this
consistently has been found to be immunized: Yelp did not sponsor the
review, add content to it, or solicit the specific content of the review with a
questionnaire. Because Yelp's conduct of categorizing reviews and making
some more visible than others is merely an exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial function, it is entirely protected by Section 230.
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B.

Yelp's Standard License Contained in Its Terms of
Service Does Not Transform Yelp into a Content
Provider.

Nor can Yelp's Terms of Service, which grant Yelp a non-exclusive
license to use user-submitted content - a license that Yelp uses to display
others' content on its website- transform Yelp into an information content
provider and deprive it of Section 230 immunity. Hassell provided no case
law to support the notion that Yelp can become a content provider merely
through license terms. And indeed, licensing content is not the equivalent
of creating or developing it for purposes of Section 230. The ruling in
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,49-52 (D.D.C. 1998), is

instructive. There, AOL had a license agreement with Matt Drudge to
provide the "Drudge Report" for AOL in exchange for a salary. The
agreement "by its terms contemplates more than a passive role for AOL; in
it, AOL reserves the 'right to remove, or direct [Drudge] to remove, any
content which, as reasonably detennined by AOL ... violates AOL's thenstandard Terms of Service ... "'. I d. at 51. Additionally, AOL was aware of
the Drudge Report's propensity for gossip, issuing a press release stating
that, "AOL has made Matt Drudge instantly accessible to members who
crave instant gossip and news breaks." Jd. Nonetheless, despite this active
role and the direct financial benefit to AOL, the court held that AOL was
immune from suit under Section 230 for claims related to the Drudge
Report. The court noted that as a matter of policy, "Congress decided not
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to treat providers of interactive computer services like other information
providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio stations,
all of which may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or
defamatory material written or prepared by others." !d. at 49.
Far from the facts of Blumenthal, in which AOL entered an
exclusive license with Drudge knowing in advance the type of content it
was buying, all Hassell alleges is that Yelp's standard Terms of Service
includes a broad license to all reviews on its website, which enables Yelp to
publish them. Yelp is not aware of any court ever denying Section 230
immunity based on licensing tenns, much less the standard tenns at issue
here. If these standard Terms of Service were sufficient to transform Yelp
into a content provider, then it would be a content provider for every
statement posted on Yelp based on the mere existence of the licensing
provisions that enable it to publish that content, a nonsensical result entirely
incompatible with the purpose of Section 230.

C.

Yelp's Refusal to Remove the Review Pending Resolution
oflts Motion to Vacate, and Its Challenge to the
Unconstitutional Injunction, Have No Bearing on Its
Immunity Under Section 230.

In denying Yelp's motion to vacate the injunction, the trial court did
not address Section 230 or explain how its findings overcame the immunity
provided under the statute. Instead, it found only that the injunction could
apply to Yelp, as a non-party, because it deemed Yelp to be "aiding and
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abetting Bird's violation of the injunction." It listed three findings in
support of this conclusion. None of the three provide a basis to overcome
Yelp's immunity under Section 230.
The first basis was that Yelp designated B irdzeye B.'s review as a
"recommended review." A00809:12-16. As explained above (see supra
Argument II.A), Yelp's practice of displaying recommended reviews
separate from non-recommended reviews is merely an exercise of Yelp's
editorial control and cannot defeat Yelp's immunity under Section 230.

Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 62.
The remaining findings address Yelp's conduct well after the content
at issue was posted on Yelp and the injnnction had issued. The trial court's
second basis was that Yelp was "acting on behalf of Bird" by moving the
court to set aside the judgment in its entirety, and questioning whether
Hassell provided adequate notice to Bird of the Action. A00809:16A00810:2. As discussed above, (see supra Argument l.B), Yelp's conduct
in this litigation provides no grounds for denying the motion to vacate. The
third basis was that Yelp refused to delete the reviews prior to a judicial
determination of its motion to vacate the injunction. A0081 0:3-6. But this
also cannot defeat the immunity that Section 230 provides to Yelp.
The law is clear that a service provider is immune from liability for
content it does not create or develop, even where it refuses to remove that
content after receiving notice to do so. MA. v. Village Voice Media, 809 F.
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Supp. 2d at I 051 ("[E]ven if a service provider knows that third parties are
posting illegal content, the service provider's failure to intervene is
immunized,") (citation and internal quotation omitted); Universal Commc'n

Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Section 230
immunity applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the
third-party content."; no liability even where provider was allegedly
"manifestly aware" of the unlawful speech); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (no liability where AOL delayed in taking down
allegedly defamatory messages and failed to screen for similar postings
thereafter). Thus, even if a provider has actual knowledge that third parties
are posting illegal content, "the service provider's failure to intervene is
immunized." Goddard, 2008 WL 5245490, at *3; see also Gregerson v.

Vilano Fin., Inc., No. 06-1164 ADM/AJB, 2008 WL 451060, at *9 n.3 (D.
Minn. Feb. 15, 2008) (upholding Section 230 immunity even after website
operator was made aware of objections to third-party comments posted on
site); see Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 108 Wash. App. 454,463-64
(200 I) (Amazon entitled to Section 230 immunity even though plaintiff
provided notice of unlawful content and Amazon failed to remove it).
In Barrett v. Rosenthal, the Supreme Court explained at length why
Section 230 immunizes websites from liability for their conduct after they
have received notice that they are hosting defamatory material. First,
notice liability "would provide a natural incentive to simply remove
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messages upon notification, chilling the freedom oflnternet speech." 40
Cal. 4th at 54-55. Second, "notice-based liability would deter service
providers from actively screening the content of material posted on its
service, because discovering potentially defamatory material would only
increase the provider's liability." !d. at 55. Third, notice-based liability
"would allow complaining parties to impose substantial burdens on the
freedom of Internet speech by lodging complaints whenever they were
displeased by an online posting." !d. at 57. The Supreme Court noted that
the "volume and range oflnternet communications make the 'heckler's
veto' a real threat" under a notice-based liability rule, and that the United
States Supreme Court "has cautioned against reading the CDA to confer
such a broad power of censorship on those offended by Internet speech."

!d.
Under this uniform authority, Yelp cannot be enjoined. Regardless
of whether or not Yelp removed the Birdzeye B. posting, and regardless of
what arguments it made in challenging the validity of the injunction against
it, it did not create the posts at issue, and is therefore immune from liability
under Section 230. Any other holding would confer the power of
censorship on plaintiffs like Hassell. Her reward for denying Yelp its due
process should not be the ability to censor Yelp while Yelp appeals the
injunction.
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III.

THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT
The

i~unction

requires non-party Yelp to banish all record of not

just Birdzeye B's first review, but also two additional comments from two
different user accounts that were not properly before the trial court- one of
which was written after the Complaint was filed and served. Even more
egregiously, the injunction seeks to ban non-party Yelp from publishing
future comments from these two users, regardless of what they may write whether true statements, constitutionally protected opinion, or even an
absolutely privileged fair and true report of judicial proceedings.
Such an order would "freeze[]," not just chill, Yelp's exercise of its
rights to publish comments that already exist and future writings. See

Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (!976). "The right to
free speech is ... one of the cornerstones of our society," and is protected
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and under an
"even broader" provision of the California Constitution. Hurvitz v.

Hoejjlin, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1241 (2000); see Cal. Const., art. I,§ 2,
subd. (a).) The California Constitution provides that: "Every person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments, on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge
liberty of speech or press." Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a). As the
California Supreme Court held long ago, "[t]he wording of this section is
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terse and vigorous, and its meaning so plain that construction is not needed.
The right of the citizen to freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments is
unlimited .... He shall have no censor over him to whom he must apply for
permission to speak, write, or publish .... " Dailey v. Superior Court, 112
Cal. 94, 97 (1896).
An injunction that forbids a citizen from speaking is known as a
"prior restraint." Evans v. Evans, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1169 (2008)
(finding that a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendant in that case
from making defamatory statements was unconstitutional). A prior
restraint on expression "comes ... with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415,419 (!971) (citation omitted); accord Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Maggi v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 1218,
1225 (2004). This antipathy toward prior restraints remains strong even
where substantial competing interests are asserted. See Near v. State of
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 704-705 (1931) (rejecting restraint on publication

of any periodical containing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory"
matter). For example, in Nebraska Press, the United States Supreme Court
rejected a prior restraint against the publication of a criminal defendant's
murder confession, even though the Court found that such publicity "might
impair the defendant's right to a fair trial" under the Sixth Amendment.
427 U.S. at 563. Likewise, the Supreme Court repeatedly has found that
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First Amendment rights to publish must prevail even in cases involving
such strong interests as the confidentiality of rape victims, Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (invalidating Georgia law

restricting publication of rape victim's name), Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (involving publication of a rape victim's name), and
the interest in protecting minors charged with murder, Okla. Pub! 'g Co. v.
Dist. Court for Okla. Cnty., 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977).

Below, Hassell relied entirely on Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v.
Lemen, 40 Cal. 4th 1141 (2007), a case arising under a unique set offacts

not presented by this case, and which supports a finding that the injunction
issued against Yelp is overbroad and unconstitutional. In Balboa Island,
the California Supreme Court held that a court may enjoin the repetition of
a statement "which a jury has detennined to be defamatory." !d. at 1158. It
also held that "it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief prior
to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of statements judicially
determined to be defamatory." !d. at 1158. The Supreme Court found the
injunction in Balboa Island to be invalid because it was "broader than
necessary to provide relief to plaintiff while minimizing the restriction of
expression." !d. at 1160. Specifically, it applied not just to the defendant
but also to "all other persons in active concert and participation with her,"
when there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that anyone
other than the defendant had made the defamatory statements. !d. at 1160.
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In addition, it prohibited defendant from making privileged statements,
such as "presenting her grievances to government officials," which the
Supreme Court noted is among the most precious of the liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1160.
Under Balboa Island, the trial court's injunction here is
impermissibly broad. Even assuming that Birdzeye B' s first statement may
be enjoined after a default judgment rather than a jury trial determinationalthough the Supreme Court in Balboa Island carefully limited its narrow
holding to judgments entered after a jury trial (40 Cal. 4th at 1158)- the
trial court plainly erred in refusing to vacate the injunction to the extent it
applies to future statements. Indeed, the injunction is so broad as to ban
any "subsequent comments of the reviewer," either Birdzeye B. or J.D.,
regardless of what either of them write. That would include statements
regarding the judicial proceedings, which are privileged under Civil Code
Section 47(d). Because the injunction against future comments is not
limited to repetition of defamatory statements, it is impermissibly
overbroad and unconstitutional. See Balboa Island, 40 Cal. 4th at 1160.
In addition, the injunction purports to enjoin two statements that
were not properly before the trial court. One of those two statements,
Birdzeye B's comment on the litigation, had not been posted at the time
Hassell filed and served her Complaint, which was never amended to
include the subsequent comment. And while Hassell had included J.D.'s
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statement in the Complaint, she did not identify those statements with
particularity as part of her libel claim as required to obtain an injunction.
See Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, No. CV 09-07666 DDP (RNBx), 2011 WL
4352408, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011). In Oakley, the court found that
"unlike in Balboa Island, the defamatory statements at issue have not been
identified with sufficient particularity to rule on them one by one." !d. It
held that "[w]ithout argument and a record that permits the court to
consider Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction enjoining
Defendant's speech on a statement by statement [basis], the court is not in a
position to consider Defendants' request." !d. Similarly here, the court
lacked a record to permit it to legitimately enjoin either the J.D. statement,
or BirdzeyeB's second comment.
For these reasons, the First Amendment plainly bars the injunctive
relief the trial court granted against Yelp.
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CONCLUSION
Because Yelp received no notice of the injunction against it, in
breach of its due process rights; and because Section 230 bars the
injunction; and because the injunction is so broad as to constitute an
unconstitutional prior restraint, this Court should reverse the denial of
Yelp's motion to vacate the judgment.
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mail to Judge Goldsmith of the San Francisco Superior Court by enclosing true and
correct copies of said document in an envelope and placed it for collection and mailing
with the United States Post Office on January 8, 2015:
Monique Olivier, Esq.
Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier
I 00 Bush Street - Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94104

Attorneys for Dawn Hassell
The Hassell Law Group, a P.C.

Telephone: 415-433-0333
Facsimile: 415-449-6556
Email: monique@dplolaw.com
Ernest H. Goldsmith, Judge
San Francisco Superior Court
Civic Center Courthouse
400 McAllister St.
San Francisco, CA 94102
I am readily familiar with my firm's practice for collection and processing of
correspondence for delivery in the manner indicated above, to wit, that correspondence
will be deposited for collection in the above-described manner this same day in the
ordinary course of business.
I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that
the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on January 8, 2015, at San Fr ncisco,
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